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Abstract—We consider i) the overhead minimization of
maximum-distance separable (MDS) storage codes for the repair
of a single failed node and ii) the total secure degrees-of-
freedom (S-DoF) maximization in a multiple-access compound
wiretap channel. We show that the two problems are connected.
Specifically, the overhead minimization for a single node failure of
an optimal MDS code, i.e. one that can achieve the information
theoretic overhead minimum, is equivalent to maximizing the
S-DoF in a multiple-access compound wiretap channel. Addi-
tionally, we show that maximizing the S-DoF in a multiple-
access compound wiretap channel is equivalent to minimizing the
overhead of an MDS code for the repair of a departed node. An
optimal MDS code maps to a full S-DoF channel and a full S-DoF
channel maps to an MDS code with minimum repair overhead
for one failed node. We also state a general framework for
code-to-channel and channel-to-code mappings and performance
bounds between the two settings. The underlying theme for
all connections presented is interference alignment (IA). The
connections between the two problems become apparent when we
restate IA as an optimization problem. Specifically, we formulate
the overhead minimization and the S-DoF maximization as rank
constrained, sum-rank and max-rank minimization problems
respectively. The derived connections allow us to map repair
strategies of recently discovered repair codes to beamforming
matrices and characterize the maximum S-DoF for the single
antenna multiple-access compound wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial volume of recent work has focused on wire-
less interference alignment techniques [1] – [5] for wiretap
channels [6] – [11]. For these settings, the high SNR secure
capacity scaling or the capacity prelog factor is the S-DoF that
measure the number of secure and interference free space,
time, and frequency dimensions. Confining interference and
wiretapped dimensions to the minimum subspace maximizes
the S-DoF and achieves the high SNR secure capacity. Per-
fectly fulfilling this purpose, IA serves as a means to maximize
the secure and interference free signaling dimensions.
Interestingly, IA was recently used in a different framework
to achieve minimum overhead repair of failed storage nodes
in MDS coded distributed storage systems [12] – [20]. For
the repair problem that we study, a data node of the storage
array fails and a newcomer takes its place to exactly regenerate
the missing contents. Appropriate repair strategies are used
to mix a sufficient amount of the remaining data so that the
newcomer downloads it and reconstructs the missing contents.
This repair process is equivalent to solving an underdetermined
system of equations in the lost data, where the undesired file
pieces generate interference to a square system of equations
in the lost contents. The interference has to be subtracted
and the remaining system of interest needs to be full rank.
The download overhead to obtain the full rank property and
erase interference is proportional to the size of the lost data
plus the total number of interference dimensions. Therefore,
MDS storage codes and repair strategies resulting to maximum
aligned interference spaces, minimize the overhead to repair a
failure in the system.
In parallel to the repair problem, we study the multiple-
access compound wiretap channel. A number of non-
interfering users aim to communicate with one receiver of
interest, while keeping their messages secret with respect to
a group of non-cooperating eavesdroppers. To maximize the
perfect secrecy data rate, the beamforming strategies of each
user have to be designed so that the signaling dimensions
observed by the eavesdropper with the sharpest eye are min-
imized. That way, the number of secure links between the
users and the legitimate receiver at the worst wiretapping
scenario are maximized. The concept of IA comes to place
when designing the beamforming strategies so that the signal
spaces of the users align on top of each other causing the
best eavesdropper to have access to the minimum number of
communication dimensions.
Our contributions: Motivated by interference alignment
that is employed in both cases [13], [19], [20], [8], and
[7], we aim to bridge the two seemingly different settings.
We establish the connection by formulating IA as a rank
minimization, in the same manner as [21]: i) Given an MDS
storage code, minimizing the overhead to exactly regenerate
a failed node in the storage array is equivalent to a rank
constrained, sum of ranks minimization, ii) for a multiple-
access compound wiretap channel, the S-DoF maximization
can be recast to a rank constrained, maximum-rank min-
imization, when the user signal spaces span all available
dimensions. Then, for the class of optimal MDS storage codes
achieving the information theoretic minimum overhead bound
of [12], the overhead minimization for the repair problem is
equivalent to the S-DoF maximization in a class of multiple-
access compound wiretap channels. Accordingly, for a class of
multiple-access compound wiretap channels, maximizing the
S-DoF is equivalent to minimizing the overhead of an MDS
code for the repair a failed node. Additional connections come
in the form of code-to-channel, channel-to-code, and repair
and beamforming strategy mappings. We further establish
mappings and overhead or S-DoF bounds for general classes
of codes or channels.
Although we provide constructive examples that validate the
connection, we need to note that there is one important differ-
ence between the two problems: distributed storage problems
require rank minimization over a finite field whereas S-DoF
maximization over the reals. Surprisingly, the symbol exten-
sion technique [19] is applicable in both cases, for sufficiently
large finite fields. The derived connection allows us to map
repair strategies of recently discovered codes in [19] and [20]
to beamforming matrices and characterize the maximum S-
DoF for the single antenna multiple-access compound wiretap
channel, extending the works of [8] and [7]. Bagherikaram et
al. [8] asymptotically achieve the outer bound of L−1
L
S-DoF
for L users and the single eavesdropper case, whereas Khisti
[7] achieves the same bound for the L antenna MISO with
multiple eavesdroppers.
II. REPAIR OF MDS STORAGE CODES
In this section, we consider the process of exactly repairing
a failed node in an MDS encoded distributed storage system
[14]. We show that given the storage code, the overhead
minimization for the repair of a single node failure can be
recast to a rank constrained sum of ranks minimization.
Let a file f , without loss of generality be subpacketized
into M = k(n − k)β “bits” such that f ∈ Fk(n−k)β and
partitioned in k parts f =
[
fT1 . . . f
T
k
]T
, with fi ∈ F(n−k)β ,
where M denotes the filesize in “bits” and β ∈ N∗ the degree
of subpacketization.1 We want to store this file with rate k
n
≤ 1
across k systematic and n−k parity storage units with storage
capacity α = M
k
each. Moreover, we require to retrieve the
original file by accessing any k of these n storage nodes. These
redundancy and retrieval properties are achieved by using an
(n, k)β MDS code to encode the file across the storage nodes.
The encoding is given by
[
Ik(n−k)β×k(n−k)β A
T
]
f , where
IN is the N ×N identity matrix and we use
A
△
=


A
(1)
1 . . . A
(n−k)
1
A
(1)
2 . . . A
(n−k)
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
(1)
k . . . A
(n−k)
k

 ∈ F
k(n−k)β×(n−k)2β (1)
to denote the given systematic (n, k)β MDS code, where
A
(p)
i ∈ F
(n−k)β×(n−k)β
, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and p ∈
{1, . . . , n − k}. Posterior to the data encoding process k
systematic storage nodes {1, . . . , k}, individually store one of
the k parts of the file, f1, . . . , fk, respectively. Each of the
n − k parity nodes {1, . . . , n − k}, stores a unique linear
1For distributed storage problems F corresponds to a finite field; for the
sake of generality we note that F may represent the real numbers.
systematic node file data
1 f1
.
.
.
.
.
.
k fk
parity node parity data
1
(
A
(1)
1
)T
f1 + . . .+
(
A
(1)
k
)T
fk
.
.
.
.
.
.
n− k
(
A
(n−k)
1
)T
f1 + . . .+
(
A
(n−k)
k
)T
fk
Fig. 1. STORAGE CODE
combination of the same k file pieces. The structure of the
storage array is given in Fig. 1, where each node expends
exactly α = (n − k)β worth of storage capacity. Observe
that A(p)i ∈ F(n−k)β×(n−k)β represents a matrix of coding
coefficients used by the pth parity node to “mix” the contents
of the ith file piece fi, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, p ∈ {1, . . . , n− k}.
To maintain the same redundancy when a single systematic
node fails, a repair process takes place to regenerate the lost
data in a newcomer storage component. This process is carried
out as linear operations on the contents of the n−1 remaining
nodes. Let for example, an (n, k)β MDS code A and a
systematic node i ∈ {1, . . . , k} of the array of n nodes fail.
Then, a newcomer joins the storage network and we assume
it connects to all n − 1 remaining nodes that are required to
transmit to it sufficient data to reconstruct fi. The repair of
systematic node i ∈ {1, . . . , k} can be seen as a two parallel
part process. First, observe that the missing piece fi exists as
a term of linear combination only at each parity node, as Fig.
1 shows. Carrying out one part of the repair, each parity node
p ∈ {1, . . . , n−k} sends a size of β data (β equations) to the
newcomer
y
(p)
i =
(
R
(p)
i
)T ((
A
(p)
1
)T
f1 + . . .+
(
A
(p)
k
)T
fk
)
=
[
A
(p)
1 R
(p)
i . . .A
(p)
k R
(p)
i
]T
f ∈ Fβ,
where R(p)i ∈ F(n−k)β×β is the repair matrix that is free to
design and mixes the contents of parity node p for the repair
process of systematic node i, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In the same
manner, all parity nodes proceed in sending a total of (n−k)β
linear equations to the newcomer. Eventually, it receives the
following stack of equations
yi
△
=
[(
y
(1)
i
)T
. . .
(
y
(n−k)
i
)T ]
=


(
A
(1)
1 R
(1)
i
)T
. . .
(
A
(1)
k R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
1 R
(n−k)
i
)T
. . .
(
A
(n−k)
k R
(n−k)
i
)T

 f (2)
=


(
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
)T

fi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
useful data
+
k∑
u=1,u 6=i


(
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
)T

fu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference by fu
,
where yi ∈ F(n−k)β . Retrieving the lost piece solely from
(2) is equivalent to solving an underdetermined set of (n −
k)β equations in the k(n− k)β unknown variables of f , with
respect to only the (n− k)β unknowns of fi. Obtaining fi is
not possible due to the interference components in the received
equations created by the undesired (k−1)(n−k)β unknowns
fu, u ∈ {1, . . . , k}\i, as noted in (2).
Hence, for the other part of the repair process, the newcomer
needs to “erase” all interference caused by the undesired (k−
1)(n− k)β unknowns. This is possible through downloading
data from the remaining systematic nodes {1, . . . , k}\i and
appropriately combining them to construct exactly the sum of
interference components and regenerate fi from yi through the
following linear operations
fi =


(
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
)T


−1
yi−
k∑
u=1,u 6=i


(
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
)T

 fu

 .
(3)
To uniquely determine fi, it is required that
rank
([
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i . . . A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
])
= (n− k)β, (4)
therefore it is necessary that all downloaded equations of
(2) are linearly independent. Surprisingly, the size of data
needed to be downloaded from the systematic nodes to erase
interference is not necessarily equal to the size of interfering
components (k − 1) · (n − k)β, but depends on the level of
alignment of such interference. Namely, to erase interference
created by fu, we need only download from the systematic
part u the smallest number of equations that can generate
the interference components: a size equal the dimension of a
linearly independent basis of the row span of the interference
space
[
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . . A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
]
, u ∈ {1, . . . , k}\i,
suffices.
Consequently, the size of data needed to be downloaded
from the systematic parts to erase interference, equals exactly
the sum of ranks of the interference spaces
k∑
u=1,u6=i
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . . A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
.
Therefore, for an (n, k)β MDS code A and a certain set of
repair matrices
Ri
△
=
[
R
(1)
i . . .R
(n−k)
i
]
∈ F(n−k)β×(n−k)
2β (5)
the overhead for exact repair of a systematic node i ∈
{1, . . . , k} is defined as
δ
(
(n, k)β ,PiA,Ri
)
△
=
(n− k)β +
∑k
u=1,u 6=i rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
(n− k)β
= 1 +
k∑
u=1,u 6=i
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
(n− k)β
, (6)
where Pi
△
=
[
ETi E
T
1 . . .E
T
i−1E
T
i+1 . . .E
T
k
]T
, Ei
△
= ei ⊗
I(n−k)β , and ei corresponds to the ith column of Ik, for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Observe that for an (n, k)β MDS code A we
have
PiA =


A
(1)
i . . . A
(n−k)
i
A
(1)
1 . . . A
(n−k)
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
(1)
i−1 . . . A
(n−k)
i−1
A
(1)
i+1 . . . A
(n−k)
i+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
(1)
k
. . . A
(n−k)
k


,
i.e. the first row block corresponds to the set of coding matrices
multiplying file piece fi, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Therefore, the overhead is the ratio of the number of
downloaded equations to the size of the lost piece. This ratio is
minimized when the interference alignment is maximized, i.e.
when the row spans of the matrices generating the interference
belong to a subspace of minimum dimension. To minimize
the overhead δ ((n, k)β ,PiA,Ri), for a given (n, k)β MDS
storage code A, we can only optimize over the repair matrices
Ri. This optimization can be recast to the following rank con-
strained, sum of ranks minimization that has to be performed
over F
R ((n, k)β ,PiA) :
min
R
(1)
i
,...,R
(n−k)
i
k∑
u=1,u6=i
rank
([
A(1)u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
s.t.: rank
([
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
])
= (n− k)β.
Lemma 1: For a given (n, k)β MDS storage code A, solv-
ing R ((n, k)β ,PiA) is equivalent to minimizing the overhead
to repair node i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We note that the minimum repair overhead for a code
of a given rate drastically depends on its design. The cut-
set analysis of [12] defines optimal (n, k)β MDS storage
codes that achieve the information theoretic minimum repair
overhead: each of the n − 1 surviving nodes has to deliver
a size of exactly β repair data. This means that when repair
has to be performed for these storage codes, we can always
find repair matrices such that interference spaces align in β-
dimensional subspaces, resulting to minimum repair overhead
n−1
n−k .
We now shift to a seemingly unrelated problem: the S-DoF
maximization of a multiple-access compound wiretap channel.
Then, we establish a formal connection to the repair problem.
III. MULTIPLE-ACCESS COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider a multiple-access compound
wiretap channel. We show that given full rank signal spaces,
the S-DoF maximization can be formulated as a rank con-
strained maximum rank minimization.
In the multiple-access compound wiretap channel, L users
wish to communicate with a sole legitimate receiver, while
maintaining message secrecy with respect to K−1 eavesdrop-
pers. Each user l ∈ {1, . . . L} is equipped with Mt transmit
antennas and wishes to transmit a length N symbol vector
x(l) ∈ RN×1. We assume that the legitimate receiver and
each eavesdropper v is equipped with Mr receive antennas,
respectively, where v ∈ {1, . . . ,K−1}. We further assume that
Mt = Mr = LN . We denote such channel as an (L,N)K−1
multiple-access compound wiretap channel. The LN×1 pulse
matched and downconverted received signals at the legitimate
receiver and the vth eavesdropper are
y =
L∑
l=1
H(l)V(l)x(l) +w (7)
and yev =
L∑
l=1
H(l)evV
(l)x(l) +wev, (8)
respectively, where H(l) ∈ RLN×LN represents the “channel
processing” between the lth user and the receiver of interest,
V(l) ∈ RLN×N is the beamforming matrix of user l, and w
accounts for zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise with
covariance matrix σ2ILN , where v ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} and
l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. H
(l)
ev ∈ RLN×LN represents the channel be-
tween the lth user and eavesdropper v and wev corresponds to
the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise with covariance
matrix σ2ILN , for v ∈ {1, . . . ,K−1} and l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. We
further assume a power constraint on the transmitted signal of
each user E
{∥∥V(l)x(l)∥∥2
2
}
≤ P and
(
V(l)
)T
V(l) = P
N
IN ,
for some P > 0, and all l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. We assume that
the elements of all channel matrices are drawn i.i.d. from a
continuous distribution and at each channel use all receivers
and transmitters have perfect channel knowledge.
We proceed by rewriting (7) and (8) as
y =
[
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
]
x+w
and yev =
[
H(1)ev V
(1) . . .H(L)ev V
(L)
]
x+wev
and defining
H
△
=


H(1) . . . H(L)
H
(1)
e1 . . . H
(L)
e1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
H
(1)
e(K−1) . . . H
(L)
e(K−1)

 ∈ R
KLN×L2N , (9)
which denotes an instance of an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access
compound wiretap channel. We further define the concatena-
tion of all L beamforming matrices
V
△
=
[
V(1) . . .V(L)
]
∈ RLN×LN . (10)
Then, to achieve the secure sum capacity for perfect secrecy
of an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound wiretap channel
at the high SNR regime, we have to maximize the (nor-
malized) total S-DoF. For this case the total S-DoF of an
(L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound wiretap channel H, for
a given set of beamforming matrices V, and assuming x(l),
l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, is a zero-mean real Gaussian vector with
covariance matrix IN , is given by
η
(
(L,N)K−1 ,H,V
)
(11)
△
=
[
rank
([
H
(1)
V
(1). . .H(L)V(L)
])
− max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
rank
([
H
(1)
ev V
(1). . .H(L)ev V
(L)
])]+
LN
,
where [a]+ =
{
a, a > 0,
0, a ≤ 0
. Hence, the set of beamforming
matrices V has to be designed such that the legitimate signal
space spans the maximum dimensions possible and each of
the K − 1 eavesdropper signal spaces has to collapse in as
small dimensions as possible, such that the maximum number
of dimensions among the eavesdropper spaces is minimized.
Observe that given a signal space
[
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
]
spanning LN dimensions, the S-DoF of an (L,N)K−1
multiple-access compound wiretap channel H can be maxi-
mized by solving the following optimization problem
V
(
(L,N)
K−1
,H
)
:
min
V(1),...,V(L)
max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
rank
([
H(1)ev V
(1) . . .H(L)ev V
(L)
])
s.t.: rank
([
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
])
= LN.
Lemma 2: For a given (L,N)K−1 multiple-access com-
pound wiretap channel H, solving V
(
(L,N)K−1 ,H
)
is
equivalent to maximizing the total S-DoF, when the legitimate
signal space spans LN dimensions.
We note that the minimum rank of an eavesdropper’s
observable space cannot be less than N assuming that the
beamforming matrices are full column rank due to each
beamforming matrix being full rank. The following bound
η
(
(L,N)
K−1
,H,V
)
≤
LN −N
LN
=
L− 1
L
(12)
always serves as an outerbound to the achievable total S-DoF.
In the next section, we establish a connection between the
S-DoF maximization and the repair overhead minimization.
IV. ESTABLISHING THE CONNECTIONS
The two models of sections II and III correspond to
physically unrelated settings. However, we observe in the
following that the two problems share the same mathematical
formulation. This allows us to establish a connection between
the overhead minimization and the S-DoF maximization.
We begin by observing that for both overhead minimization
and S-DoF maximization setups, there exist two types of
spaces with respect to the respective objectives: the “useful”
spaces and the “harmful” spaces. The useful spaces need
always be full rank for both problems. Then, the sum of
dimensions of the set of harmful spaces for the first prob-
lem, or the maximum dimension of harmful space for the
second, need to be minimized respectively. Specifically, for
the overhead minimization problem, the useful space when
we repair node i is
[
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
]
, while
the k − 1 interference spaces
[
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
]
,
u ∈ {1, . . . , k}\i, consist harmful components; the larger their
sum of dimensions, the larger the overhead to repair systematic
node i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then, for the S-DoF maximization,
the useful space is
[
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
]
, while there
exist K − 1 eavesdropper spaces
[
H
(1)
ev V
(1) . . .H
(L)
ev V
(L)
]
,
OVERHEAD MINIMIZATION FOR REPAIR OF NODE i S-DoF Maximization
Spaces
Useful data space
[
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
] [
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
]
Legitimate receiver space
Interference space
[
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
] [
H
(1)
ev V
(1) . . .H
(L)
ev V
(L)
]
Eavesdropper’s space
Matrices
Code matrix PiA H Channel matrix
Repair strategy Ri V Beamforming strategy
Dimensions
# Parity nodes n− k L # Users
# Interference spaces k − 1 K − 1 # Wiretapped spaces
Subpacketization β N # Symbols/User
Constraints
rank
([
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
])
= (n− k)β rank
([
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
])
= LN
Cost functions(∗)
k∑
u=1,u 6=i
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
min
v∈{1,...,K−1}
rank
([
H
(1)
ev V
(1) . . .H
(L)
ev V
(L)
])
Fig. 2. ANALOGIES
v ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, that potentially harm the objective; the
larger the maximum of their dimensions, the lower the S-DoF.
Furthermore, we observe that each parity node p ∈
{1, . . . , n − k} and each user l ∈ {1, . . . , L} is associated
with a repair matrix R(p)i and a beamforming matrix V(l),
respectively. The repair and beamforming matrices multiply i)
one matrix (A(p)i or H(l) respectively) contributing to useful
space and ii) k−1 or K−1 matrices (A(p)u , u ∈ {1, . . . , k}\i,
or H
(l)
ev , v ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, respectively) contributing
to harmful spaces. Then, given an (n, k)β MDS code A,
we optimize over the n − k matrices R(1)i , . . . ,R
(n−k)
i to
minimize the sum of interference space dimensions; that way
the overhead to repair node i is minimized. Analogously, for a
given (L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound wiretap channel
H, we optimize over L matrices V(1), . . . ,V(L) so that the
largest eavesdropper space is minimized; hence, the S-DoF is
maximized.
Interestingly, we use these mathematical formulation analo-
gies to prove that the two problems are equivalent and direct
code-to-channel or channel-to-code mappings are possible
when the codes considered are optimal or the channels achieve
the outerbound of (12). When considering conventional MDS
codes and more general multiple-access compound wiretap
channels, we establish performance bounds in terms of repair
overhead and achievable S-DoF. Before we proceed, it is
important note that i) in contrast to storage codes, channels
are given by nature and ii) for equivalencies and mappings to
hold calculations have to be performed over the same field.
All analogies stated in this section are given in Fig. 2. (∗)
denotes that the analogy holds for optimal MDS codes and
full S-DoF channels.
A. Equivalent Problems
In the following, we state the connections between the repair
overhead minimization for optimal MDS codes with the S-DoF
maximization for channels that achieve (12). The connections
are articulated through theoreoms that R and V are equiva-
lent, code-to-channel and channel-to-code mappings for MDS
codes and multiple-access compound wiretap channels, and
constructive examples.2
Theorem 1: Let an optimal (n, k)β MDS code A. Then,
R ((n, k)β ,PiA) is equivalent to V
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA
)
,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Corollary 1: Let an optimal (n, k)β MDS code A, de-
fined over R. Then, A maps to k, (n− k, β)k−1 multiple-
access compound wiretap channel instances H = PiA,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where the outer bound of n−k−1
n−k S-DoF is
achievable.
Following Theorem 1, we establish that the S-DoF maxi-
mization for the class of multiple-access compound wiretap
channels where (12) is achievable, is equivalent to the repair
overhead minimization of a storage code.
Theorem 2: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access com-
pound wiretap channel H, where L−1
L
total S-DoF
is achievable. Then, V
(
(L,N)K−1,H
)
is equivalent to
R ((L+K,K)N ,H).
Corollary 2: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound
wiretap channel H, where L−1
L
S-DoF is achievable. Then,
H maps to an (L + K,K)N MDS code A = H, where the
overhead to repair systematic node 1 is n−1
n−k .
Remark: If the elements of H are drawn i.i.d. from a con-
tinuous distribution, then H maps to an optimal (L+K,K)N
MDS code A = H.
Theorems 1 and 2 explicitly state that if there existed
a black-box that could solve V
(
(L,N)K−1,H
)
, then this
box could be used to solve R ((n, k)β,PiA) for optimal
MDS codes. A vice versa statement holds for multiple-access
compound wiretap channels where (12) is achievable. We
establish that optimal MDS codes map to channels where (12)
2Henceforth, we assume that an algorithm solving R over a finite field F
can be converted to one over R, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and an algorithm
solving V over R can be converted to one over F.
is achievable. Accordingly, channels where (12) is tight map to
MDS codes where the repair of a single node can be performed
with minimum overhead.
For the channel-to-code mapping any channel that satisfies
the MDS properties maps to a code (over the reals) whose
structure is always of practical interest. In sharp contrast, the
code-to-channel mapping is of practical interest only when
the structure of A is not artificial and can represent realis-
tic (n− k, β)k−1 multiple-access compound wiretap channel
structures. The most interesting example comes for free after
applying Corollary 1 on the asymptotically optimal MDS
code presented in [19] and [20]. We use the code-to-channel
mapping to show that the outerbound of (12) is asymptotically
achievable and establish the S-DoF of the single antenna
multiple-access compound wiretap channel; this is possible
by mapping the repair matrices to the beamforming matrices
used by the users of such system.
Example 1: In this example, we show that L−1
L
S-DoF
is achievable for the single antenna, time-varying, multiple-
access compound wiretap channel, with L users and K − 1
eavesdroppers. To achieve this result, we use symbol extension
and set as beamforming matrices, the repair matrices used for
the asymptotically optimal MDS code presented in [19] and
[20], that maps to the same channel structure when F = R.
Most interestingly, in [19] and [20] the authors prove the
asymptotic achievability of the information theoretic minimum
overhead for the exact repair of departed nodes for MDS codes
of any rate, for β → ∞. Although this MDS code was pre-
sented for finite fields, through this example we show that the
mapping also works over the reals and this is due to the special
structure of the code and repair matrices. Moving to the single
antenna, time-varying, L users, K−1 eavesdroppers, multiple-
access compound wiretap channel, the received signals at the
legitimate receiver and the kth eavesdropper at a single channel
use are
y(t) =
L∑
l=1
h
(l)(t)xˆ(l)(t) +w(t)
and yev(t) =
L∑
l=1
h
(l)
ev (t)xˆ
(l)(t) +wev(t),
respectively, where h(l)(t) ∈ R represents the channel between
the lth user and the legitimate receiver at time t, h(l)ev (t) ∈ R
the channel between the lth user and vth eavesdropper, and
w(t) and wek(t) account for zero-mean additive white Gaus-
sian noise with variance σ2 at the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper v, where l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and v ∈ {1, . . . ,K−1}.
xˆ(l)(t) ∈ R is the sumbol that user l ∈ {1, . . . , L} transmits.
Then, we employ LN = L∆(K−1)L symbol extensions
such that

xˆ(l)(1)
.
.
.
xˆ(l)(LN)

 = V(l)x(l),H(l) =


h(l)(1). . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . .h(l)(LN)

 , and
H
(l)
ev =


h
(l)
ev (1). . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . .h
(l)
ev (LN)

 ,
for ∆ ∈ N+, l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, and v ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}.
Observe that we may perceive this symbol extended channel
as an (L,∆(K−1)L)K−1 multiple-access compound wiretap
channel, where the channel matrices are diagonal. The struc-
ture of the individual channel matrices is in accordance with
the diagonal structure of the coding matrices in [19] and
[20]. Specifically, every code (n, k)β A of [19] and [20],
with diagonal elements drawn from a continuous distribution,
maps to an (L,N)K−1 channel with matrices having the same
diagonal structure described earlier, for n − k = L, β = N ,
and k = K . For our setting we use as beamforming matrices
the repair matrices of [19] and [20], that achieve the minimum
repair overhead. Namely,
Vˆ = V(l) =
{(
L∏
l′=1
K−1∏
v=1
(
H
(l′)
ev
)α
l′,v
)
w : αl′,v ∈ {1, . . . ,∆}
}
,
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, where we assume the elements of w ∈
R
L∆(K−1)L to be drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution.
Hence, Vˆ has ∆(K−1)L linearly independent column vectors
almost surely. Then, we obtain the following
rank
([
H(1)V . . .H(L)V
])
= L∆(K−1)L
and ∆(K−1)L < rank
([
H(1)ev V . . .H
(L)
ev V
])
< (∆ + 1)(K−1)L,
with probability 1 for any v ∈ {1, . . . ,K−1}, when the chan-
nel coefficients are drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution.
For this channel we achieve the following S-DoF
η
((
L,∆(K−1)L
)K−1
,H,V
)
=
L∆(K−1)L − (∆ + 1)(K−1)L
L∆(K−1)L
∆→∞−→ L− 1
L
(13)
almost surely and asymptotically match the outer bound of
(12) for ∆ → ∞. Interestingly, this result is not a function
of the number of eavesdroppers, which is in accordance to
the MISO compound wiretap setup of [7]. As a sidenote, we
observe that the single antenna case of the channel model we
considered can be seen as a MISO compound wiretap system
where the beamforming is done independently at each antenna
element over time, still yielding the same S-DoF as in [7].
We continue with another code-to-channel mapping exam-
ple. This case is a straightforward extension of the (L, 1)1
multiple-access wiretap channel of [8], for users wishing to
transmit more than 1 symbols.
Example 2: Let an (n, 2)β MDS code A, where each
element of A is drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution.
Then, an optimal set of repair vectors for the repair of
node i are Ri =
[(
A
(1)
u
)−1
W . . .
(
A
(n−k)
u
)−1
W
]
, where
W ∈ R(n−k)β×β is also drawn i.i.d. from a continuous
distribution and (i, u) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. These repair matrices
yield an interference space of dimension β. Namely, for the
repair of systematic node i ∈ {1, 2} we have
rank




(
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
)T



 = rank




(W)T
.
.
.
(W)T



 = β,
for (i, u) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, while obeying the full rank
constraint with probability 1. The storage code A maps to
an (n − k, β)1 multiple-access wiretap channel H = A. To
achieve (12) for H, we use as beamforming matrices the repair
matrices Rˆ1, i.e. V(l) =
(
H
(l)
e1
)−1
W. Then,
rank




(
H
(1)
e1 V
(1)
)T
.
.
.(
H
(n−k)
e1 V
(n−k)
)T



 = rank




(W)T
.
.
.
(W)T



 = β,
and rank
([
H(1)V(1) . . .H(n−k)V(n−k)
])
= (n−k)β, almost
surely. Thus, n−k−1
n−k S-DoF is almost surely achievable for all,
but a measure zero set of, (n− k, β)1 multiple-access wiretap
channels. Since n− k, β ∈ N+, this result can be equivalently
stated for (L,N)1 channels, for any L,N ∈ N+.
Next, we exhibit a channel-to-code mapping, where we
rederive the optimal (n, 2) MDS code of [13] using the channel
matrices of [8].
Example 3: Let an (L, 1)1 multiple-access compound wire-
tap channel H. Then, by setting v(l) =
(
H
(l)
e
)−1
w,
for l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, such that H(l)e v(l) = w, we obtain[
H
(1)
e1 v
(1) . . .H
(L)
e1 v
(L)
]
= [w . . .w], and achieve (12), al-
most surely for vector w drawn from a continuous distri-
bution. Any such randomly drawn (L, 1)1 channel maps to
an optimal (L + 2, 2)1 MDS code A = H, or equiva-
lently, to an optimal (n, 2)1 MDS code A. Then, we use
the same structure used before for the beamforming ma-
trices, i.e., R1 =
[(
A
(1)
2
)−1
w . . .
(
A
(L)
2
)−1
w
]
and R2 =[(
A
(1)
1
)−1
w . . .
(
A
(L)
1
)−1
w
]
. Observe that these repair ma-
trices yield an interference space of dimension β = 1
for the repair of systematic node i ∈ {1, 2}, that is
rank




(
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i
)T
.
.
.(
A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
)T



 = rank




(w)
T
.
.
.
(w)
T



 = 1,
and the information theoretic minimum repair overhead L+1
L
is achieved.
B. General Performance Bounds
Here, we extend the results to more general MDS codes and
channels. Even when considering conventional MDS storage
codes, or multiple-access compound wiretap channels where
(12) is not achievable, connections still exist; this time, in the
form of achievable upper and lower bounds with respect to
repair overhead and S-DoF, respectively. The main point is
that a storage code requiring a certain overhead for the repair
of a node failure can still map to a channel where some S-
DoF can be achieved and vice versa. The general performance
bounds can be derived due to the fact that ‖s‖1
T
≤ ‖s‖∞ ≤
‖s‖1 ≤ T ‖s‖∞, for any s ∈ RT , which can be applied to the
optimization sum-rank and max-rank cost functions.
Lemma 3: Let an (n, k)β MDS code A over R and δi be
the overhead required to repair systematic node i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Then, A maps to an (n− k, β)k−1 multiple-access compound
wiretap channel H = PiA, where at least [2− δi]+ and at
most k−δi
k−1 S-DoF is achievable.
Lemma 4: Let an (n, k)β MDS code A over R and some
set of repair matrices Ri, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then, A maps to
an (n− k, β)k−1 multiple-access compound wiretap channel
H = PiA, where η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA,Ri
)
S-DoF is
achievable for V = Ri.
In the next example, we consider a code-to-channel mapping
according to Lemma (4) and study the bounds derived by
Lemma (3).
Example 4: Let an (n, k)β MDS code A and the repair
overhead required for a failure of node i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is δi
when using Ri. Then, A maps to an (n − k, β)k−1 channel
H = PiA, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For this channel we set V = Ri
and obtain
η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA,Ri
)
= η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,H,V
)
≥

 (n− k)β −∑K−1v=1 rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(n−k)
v V
(n−k)
])
(n− k)β


+
= [2− δi]+ =
{ [
n−k−(k−1)
n−k
]+
, δi =
n−1
n−k
[2− k]+ , δi = k
. (14)
and
η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA,Ri
)
= η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,H,V
)
≤
(n− k)(k − 1)β −∑K−1
v=1 rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(n−k)
v V
(n−k)
])
(k − 1)(n− k)β
=
(n− k)kβ
(k − 1)(n− k)β −
δi
k − 1
=
k − δi
k − 1 =
{
1− k+1
(k−1)(n−k) , δi =
n−1
n−k
0, δi = k
. (15)
For k = 2, (14) is tight for δi = n−1n−2 . For any k > 1 and
δi = k, (15) is always tight. Here, we considered only the two
extreme values of δi.
We continue with performance bounds for channel-to-code
mappings, for channels that do not necessarily achieve (12).
Lemma 5: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound
wiretap channel H, where η S-DoF is achievable. Then, H
maps to an (L+K,K)N MDS code A = H over R and the
overhead to repair node 1 is at most 1 + (K − 1)(1− η) and
at least 2− η.
Lemma 6: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound
wiretap channel H and a set of beamforming matrices V.
Then, H maps to an (L +K,K)N MDS code A = H over
R, where overhead δ ((L+K,K)N ,H,V) to repair node 1
is achievable for R1 = Vˆ .
We consider a code-to-channel mapping according to
Lemma (6) and study the bounds derived by Lemma (5).
Example 5: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access compound
wiretap channel H, where η S-DoF is achievable using V.
Then, H maps to an (L + K,K)N MDS code A = H. For
this code we set R1 = V and obtain
δ ((L+K,K)N ,H,V) = δ ((L+K,K)N ,A,R1)
≤
LN + (K − 1) max
u∈{2,...,K}
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
1 . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
1
])
LN
= 1 + (K − 1)(1− η) =
{
L+K−1
L
, η = L−1
L
K, η = 0
. (16)
and
δ ((L+K,K)N ,H,V) = δ ((L+K,K)N ,A,R1)
≥
LN + max
u∈{2,...,K}
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
1 . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
1
])
LN
= 2− η =
{
1 + 1
L
, η = L−1
L
2, η = 0
. (17)
Observe that (16) is tight for both cases and all any code con-
sidered, but (17) not. Again, we considered the two extreme
values of η.
We need to note that by the previous lemmas, it is implicit
that having a black-box solving either R or V is useful for both
the repair minimization and S-DoF maximization problem,
since any solution to one problem plugs in as a solution to
the corresponding mapped one in the analogous setting and
certain approximations are guaranteed.
To conclude, in this section we established connections be-
tween the repair overhead minimization of MDS storage codes
and the S-DoF maximization of multiple-access compound
wiretap channels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we showed that the repair overhead minimiza-
tion for optimal MDS storage codes is equivalent to the S-
DoF maximization in a multiple-access compound wiretap
channel. The reverse holds for multiple-access compound
wiretap channels where (12) is tight. The framework for the
connections was established by restating the two problems
as rank constrained sum-rank and max-rank minimizations,
respectively. Through this framework we established code-to-
channel and channel-to-code mappings. Using such a mapping,
we determined the maximum S-DoF in the single antenna,
multiple-access compound wiretap channel. We also extended
our results to conventional MDS storage codes and more
general channels.
APPENDIX
Proof of (11): Let
S
△
=
1√
P
[
H
(1)
V
(1)
. . .H
(L)
V
(L)
]
∈ RLN×LN ,
Sev
△
=
1√
P
[
H
(1)
ev V
(1)
. . .H
(L)
ev V
(L)
]
∈ RLN×LN
for all v ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. Then,
L ·N · η
(
(L,N)K−1 ,H,V
)
= lim
P→∞
1
2
log det
(
IMr +
1
σ2
∑L
l=1H
(l)V(l)
(
H(l)
)T (
V(l)
)T)
1
2
log
(
P
σ2
)
= lim
P→∞
1
2
log det
(
P
σ2
SST
)
− max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
1
2
log det
(
P
σ2
SevS
T
ev
)
1
2
log
(
P
σ2
)
= lim
P→∞
∑rank(S)
i=1
1
2
log
(
P
σ2
σSi
)
− max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
∑rank(Sev)
i=1
1
2
log
(
P
σ2
σvi
)
1
2
log
(
P
σ2
)
= lim
P→∞
rank(S) 1
2
log
(
P
σ2
)
− max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
rank(Sev) 12 log
(
P
σ2
)
1
2
log
(
P
σ2
)
= rank
([
H
(1)
V
(1). . .H(L)V(L)
])
− max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
rank
([
H
(1)
evV
(1). . .H
(L)
ev V
(L)
])
.
The previous example is possible when the maximum singular
values of the channel matrices are not scaling with the power
P . Namely, for the ith largest singular of matrix S, σi we
obtain
σi
△
=
1
P
max
‖x‖2=1
∥∥∥[H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)]x∥∥∥2
2
=
1
P
max
‖x‖2=1
∥∥∥∥∥
L∑
l=1
H
(l)
V
(l)
x
(l)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ 1
P
L∑
l=1
max
‖V(l)x(l)‖2≤
√
P
∥∥∥H(l)xl∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1
P
L∑
l=1
P max
‖xl‖2=1
∥∥∥H(l)xl∥∥∥2
2
= L max
i∈{1,...,LN},l∈{1,...,L}
σi
(
H
(l)
)
for x =
[(
x(1)
)T
. . .
(
x(L)
)T ]T
, xl ∈ R
LN×1
, for l ∈
{1, . . . , L}. In the same fashion, we have that the ith largest
singular value of matrix Sev is upper bounded. Hence, the
singular values are not scaling with P as long as the largest
singular values of the channels are not scaling with P . 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let an optimal (n, k)β MDS code A and
a systematic node i ∈ {1, . . . , k} fail. Then, setting L = n−k,
N = β, K = k, and H = PiA, accounts for constructing
an (n− k, β)
k−1
multiple-access compound wiretap channel
instance H. Then, the following mappings hold[
H
(1)
V
(1)
. . .H
(n−k)
V
(n−k)
]
=
[
A
(1)
i V
(1)
. . .A
(n−k)
i V
(n−k)
]
=
[
A
(1)
i R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
i R
(n−k)
i
]
and[
H
(1)
ev V
(1)
. . .H
(n−k)
ev V
(n−k)
]
=
[
A
(1)
u V
(1)
. . .A
(n−k)
u V
(n−k)
]
=
[
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
]
for any V = Ri and v =
{
u, u ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1},
u− 1, u ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , k}.
Hence, the full rank constraint of R ((n, k)β ,PiA) is equiv-
alent to the full rank constraint of V
(
(n− k, β)k−1 ,PiA
)
.
The objectives are also equivalent since
min
Ri
k∑
u=1,u6=i
rank
([
A(1)u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
= (k − 1)min
Ri
max
u∈{1,...,k}\i
rank
([
A(1)u R
(1) . . .A(n−k)u R
(n−k)
i
])
= (k − 1)min
V
max
v∈{1,...,k−1}
rank
([
H(1)ev V
(1) . . .H(n−k)ev V
(n−k)
])
= (k − 1)β.
for optimal MDS codes. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access com-
pound wiretap channel H, where L−1
L
S-DoF is achievable.
Then, setting n = L + K , K = k, β = N , and A = H,
accounts for constructing an (L+K,K)N MDS code A.
Then, the following mappings hold
[
A
(1)
1 R
(1)
1 . . .A
(L)
1 R
(L)
1
]
=
[
H
(1)
R
(1)
1 . . .H
(L)
R
(L)
1
]
=
[
H
(1)
V
(1)
. . .H
(L)
V
(L)
]
and [
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(L)
u R
(n−k)
i
]
=
[
H
(1)
ev R
(1)
1 . . .H
(L)
ev R
(L)
1
]
=
[
H
(1)
ev V
(1)
. . .H
(L)
ev V
(L)
]
for any V = Ri and v = u − 1. The full rank constraint
of V
(
(n− k, β)
k−1
,PiA
)
is equivalent to the full rank
constraint ofR ((n, k)β ,A). The objectives are also equivalent
since
(K − 1)min
V
max
v∈{1,...,K−1}
rank
([
H(1)ev V
(1) . . .H(L)ev V
(n−k)
])
= (K − 1)min
R1
max
u∈{2,...,k}
rank
([
A(1)u R
(1)
1 . . .A
(L)
u R
(L)
1
])
= min
R1
k∑
u=2
rank
([
A(1)u R
(1)
1 . . .A
(L)
u R
(n−k)
1
])
= (k − 1)β.
for channels where L−1
L
total S-DoF is achievable. 
Proof of lemma 3: Let an (n, k)β MDS code A over R
with minimum overhead to repair systematic node i equal
to δi achieved by Ri. Then, the maximum S-DoF of the
(n− k, β)k−1 channel H = PiA is upper bounded by
η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA,Ri
)
= η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,H,V
)
=
(n− k)β − max
v∈{1,...,k−1}
rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(n−k)
v V
(n−k)
])
(n− k)β
≥

 (n− k)β −∑k−1v=1 rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(n−k)
v V
(n−k)
])
(n− k)β


+
= [2− δi]+
and lower bounded by
η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA,Ri
)
= η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,H,V
)
=
(n− k)β − max
v∈{1,...,k−1}
rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(n−k)
v V
(n−k)
])
(n− k)β
≤
(k − 1)(n− k)β −∑k−1v=1 rank([H(1)v V(1) . . .H(n−k)v V(n−k)])
(k − 1)(n− k)β
=
(n− k)kβ
(k − 1)(n− k)β −
δi
k − 1
=
k
k − 1 −
δi
k − 1 .
for V = Ri, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 
Proof of lemma 4: Let an (n, k)β MDS code A over R, and
the set Ri of repair matrices for the repair of systematic node
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, satisfying the constraint of Ri((n, k)β ,PiA).
We define the (n−k, β)k−1 channel instance H = PiA. Then,
by setting V = Ri we achieve the following S-DoF for H
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
(n− k)β
−
max
u∈{1,...,k}\i
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
(n− k)β
(n− k)β − max
u∈{1,...,k}\i
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
i . . .A
(n−k)
u R
(n−k)
i
])
(n− k)β
= η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,PiA,Ri
)
= η
(
(n− k, β)k−1,H,V
)
.

Proof of lemma 5: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access com-
pound wiretap channel H where η S-DoF is achievable by V.
Then, let us define the (L+K,K)N MDS code A = H. For
this code we have
δ ((L+K,K)N ,H,V) = δ ((L+K,K)N ,A,R1)
≤
LN + (K − 1) max
u∈{2,...,K}
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
1 . . .A
(L)
u R
(L)
1
])
LN
= 1 + (K − 1)(1− η)
and
δ ((L+K,K)N ,H,V) = δ ((L+K,K)N ,A,R1)
≥
LN + max
u∈{2,...,K}
rank
([
A
(1)
u R
(1)
1 . . .A
(L)
u R
(L)
1
])
LN
= 2− η.
for R1 = V. 
Proof of lemma 6: Let an (L,N)K−1 multiple-access com-
pound wiretap channel H and the set V of beamforming
matrices, satisfying the constraint of Vi((L,N)K−1,H). We
define the (L + K,K)N MDS code instance A = H. Then,
by setting R1 = V we achieve the following overhead for the
repair of node 1
rank
([
H(1)V(1) . . .H(L)V(L)
])
LN
+
∑K−1
v=1 rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(L)
v V
(L)
i
])
LN
=
LN +
∑K−1
v=1 rank
([
H
(1)
v V
(1) . . .H
(L)
v V
(L)
])
LN
= δ ((n, k)β ,H,V) .

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